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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2016 at a Black & Decker facility in Tennessee, security 
guards escorted an employee to the company parking lot as he cursed at 
them and yelled racial slurs.1 When exiting the building, the raging 
employee pulled out a knife and fought with security.2 The employee cut 
car tires,3 raced to his vehicle in the company parking lot, retrieved his 
automatic rifle stored within it, and fired 120 rounds at security, other cars, 
and the facility.4 Law enforcement labeled the event an instance of 
“workplace violence.”5 This violent workplace shooting was made 
possible in part by a Tennessee law that forbids employers from 
proactively banning firearms from their premises. In 2013, the Tennessee 
Legislature passed a “Parking Lot,” or “Bring Your Gun to Work,” law 
(“Parking Lot law”), which prohibited employers from instituting policies 
that ban the storage of firearms in vehicles on company property, including 
the parking lot.6 As a result, the shooter could keep his firearm in his 
vehicle on the company parking lot, ready for such an attack. 
Workplace violence like the Black & Decker incident is prevalent in 
the United States.7 In 2010, there were 518 workplace homicides,8 405 of 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by MALERIE LEIGH BULOT. 
 1. Maranda Faris, Man accused of firing over 120 shots at Black & Decker, 
JACKSON SUN (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/crime 
/2016/08/29/black-decker-suspect-facing-charges-fired-120-rounds/89517874/  
[https://perma.cc/2ABE-CMVG]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Fortunately, no one was injured. Maranda Faris & Katherine Burgess, 
Disgruntled Black & Decker employee arrested in shooting, JACKSON SUN (Aug. 
25, 2016), http://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/crime/2016/08/25/shots-fired-
reported-near-passmore-lane-businesses-locked-down/89338202/ [https://perma.cc 
/EW9A-7U2A]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1313, 50-1-312 (2017). 
 7. This trend of workplace violence has persisted since at least the 1990s. 
Workplace homicides declined in 2004, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS. (2005), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/aug/wk5/art04.htm (see chart) [https://perma.cc 
/GY3G-RMBW]. Between 2006 and 2010, just over 3,000 people were victims of 
workplace homicide. Id. 
 8. Workplace Homicides from Shootings, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., 
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/osar0016.htm (last modified Sept. 16, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/ZK72-HZY7]. 
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which were shootings9 and 77 of which resulted in multiple fatalities.10 
Despite potential workplace fatalities and the employer’s duty to provide 
a safe work environment,11 employers in 21 states cannot prohibit 
employees from storing firearms in vehicles on company parking lots.12 
Though some workplace violence may be unavoidable,13 these Parking Lot 
                                                                                                             
 9. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. OFFICE OF COMMC’N, OSHA 
TRADE RELEASE: OSHA ISSUES COMPLIANCE DIRECTIVE TO ADDRESS WORKPLACE 
VIOLENCE (Sept. 8, 2011), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_docu 
ment?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=20637 [https://perma.cc/9AQA-FR86]. 
 10. Workplace Homicides from Shootings, supra note 8. The trend continued 
when in 2012 there were 463 workplace homicides, 81% of which resulted from 
shootings. News Release: National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2012 
(Preliminary Results), U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., https://www.bls.gov/news 
.release/archives/cfoi_08222013.pdf (last modified Aug. 22, 2013) [https://perma.cc 
/2M6Z-ZQ3Z]. 
 11. See, e.g., Taboas v. Mlynczak, 149 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1998); Gallose 
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84−85 (2d Cir. 1989); MacNeil v. Labor 
and Indus. Review Comm’n, 2012 WL 147861, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 
2012); Parsons v. United Tech. Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 700 A.2d 655, 666 
(Conn. 1997); Sprouse v. Miss. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 639 So. 2d 901, 904 (Miss. 
1994) (Prather, J., dissenting); see also Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 654 (2012) (aiming to provide for a hazard-free work environment). 
 12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2017); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 (2017); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2017); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-11-135 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2017); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 
65 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10 (2017); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106 (West 2017); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1 (2017); ME. 
STAT. tit. 26, § 600 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
45-9-55 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-13 
(2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a, 1290.22 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-
17-1313, 50-1-312; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 34-45-103 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m) (2017). Given the general 
prohibition, this Comment refers to these statutes as “Parking Lot laws.” 
 13. Some workplace violence is simply unavoidable—a company firearm 
ban, for instance, will not ward off disgruntled employees who retrieve guns from 
their homes, domestic violence situations that bleed into the workplace, or 
robberies. See generally Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Employer Liability for Domestic 
Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety 
Net?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 139, 148 (2000). An employer may foresee violence 
resulting from gun storage on company property. See Dana Loomis et. al., 
Employer Policies Toward Guns and the Risk of Homicide in the Workplace, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 830, 831 (2005). There is also some value in an employer 
being able to maintain a ban of firearms. One 2005 study found that a workplace 
without a firearm ban was seven times more likely to have a homicide than a 
company with a firearm ban. Loomis et al., supra, at 831. 
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laws nonetheless encumber an employer’s ability to ensure workplace 
safety14 and exercise its private property rights.15 
Although Parking Lot laws largely circumscribe an employer’s 
authority, they are the law in their respective states and govern many 
companies’ policies.16 Failure to comply with the statutes carries serious 
implications for employers; depending on the jurisdiction, criminal 
penalties or civil damages may be instituted against an employer who fails 
to comply with the statutes.17 Most Parking Lot laws, however, fail to 
provide an explicit right of action to an employee terminated for storing a 
firearm on company property.18  
When a Parking Lot law is not actionable on its face, an employee 
must first examine his employment arrangements to determine possible 
remedies upon termination. The majority of employees in the United 
States are at-will, meaning that the employer or the employee may 
terminate the employment relationship at any time for any reason.19 
Because the at-will doctrine lends itself to uncertainty and arbitrariness,20 
many states limit the negative consequences of at-will by recognizing the 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Loomis et al, supra note 13, at 831. 
 15. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. 
REV. 730, 745 (1998) (“There is strong evidence that, with respect to interests in 
land, the right to exclude is the first right to emerge in primitive property rights 
systems.”); see also Sara Sahni, Gun Battle in Georgia Over Firearms at Work, 
25 GA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2013). 
 16. 21 states have these laws. See supra note 12. 
 17. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90; FLA. STAT. § 790.251; GA. CODE ANN. § 
16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, §§ 1289.7a, 1290.22; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1313, 50-1-312; see also 
FLA. STAT. § 790.251(6) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-106. 
 18. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781; GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65; 
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10; LA. REV. STAT. § 
32:292.1; ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 45-9-55; NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 34-45-103; WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m). 
 19. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); Joseph 
Z. Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments—At-Will 
Termination of Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 NOVA L. REV. 437, 437 
(1995). At-will employment is the predominant employment doctrine across 
states, so this Comment examines at-will employment as it relates to the tort of 
wrongful discharge. 
 20. At any time and without reason, the employer or employee might decide to 
end employment. Brad Rogers Carson, Labor Law: Tate v. Browning-Ferris Industries: 
Oklahoma Creates a Common Law Action for Employment Discrimination, 46 OKLA. 
L. REV. 557, 585 (1993). 
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tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (“WDVPP”).21 The 
WDVPP tort is a public policy exception to at-will employment that curtails 
an employer’s ability to fire an employee if doing so would infringe on some 
well-established public policy.22 Though the breadth of the tort depends on 
the state, such recognized public policies are encompassed in state Parking 
Lot laws.23 These statutes elevate an employee’s rights to keep and bear 
arms and to defend himself above the private property rights of his 
employer.24 
Though a state’s recognition of WDVPP and Parking Lot legislation 
affords discharged employees a tort action for WDVPP, this Comment 
argues that terminated employees must look for an alternate remedy when 
the state they work in does not recognize WDVPP. In such a case, a 
terminated, gun-storing employee may look to a “whistleblower” statute for 
recovery.25 
Part I of this Comment examines the Second Amendment and various 
state Parking Lot laws and their exceptions. Part I also presents courts’ and 
scholars’ determinations on the constitutionality of Parking Lot laws. Part 
II explains the tort of wrongful discharge itself as it varies among the states 
along with the public policy and whistleblower exceptions to at-will 
employment. Part III focuses on a recent United States Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals case, Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation, in which 
the Fifth Circuit became the first court to recognize a gun-storing 
employee’s right of action against a former employer who violated a 
state’s Parking Lot law.26 Part IV determines that the Swindol court 
correctly decided the case after generally analyzing the rationale of 
WDVPP and the public policy considerations behind the enactment of 
Parking Lot laws. Part IV also argues that in the event a state does not 
                                                                                                             
 21. As of 2007, 44 states have recognized such an exception. Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary 
Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y J. 313, 338 (2007). 
 22. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 24. Ethan T. Stowell, Top Gun: The Second Amendment, Self-Defense, and 
Private Property Exclusion, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 521, 538 (2013). 
 25. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2017); 
see also Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-
Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 543, 549 (2004) (“The statutes typically protect three types of 
‘whistleblowing’ conduct: (1) disclosure . . . (2) assistance . . . (3) objection . . . .”). 
See generally Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and 
The Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees to Disclose 
the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316 (1993). 
 26. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 832 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2017). 
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recognize WDVPP, the existence of a whistleblower statute nonetheless 
will provide a right of action to an employee terminated for storing guns 
in his vehicle on company property. Part V surveys the employment laws 
of Utah and Louisiana, which respectively include the WDVPP tort and 
the whistleblower statute, and examines the circumstances surrounding 
their Parking Lot laws’ enactment. 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP ARMS IN PARKING LOTS 
In 2008, following increased lobbying efforts by interest groups like 
the National Rifle Association and a heightened public interest in gun 
rights,27 the United States Supreme Court’s decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller28 reexamined the Second Amendment of the United 
States Constitution,29 which grants the right to keep and bear arms, and 
ultimately disregarded a century-old precedent.30 In Heller, the Court 
shifted its understanding of the Second Amendment from a collective 
right31 to an individual right.32 Accordingly, although the Second 
Amendment encompasses an individual right to keep and bear arms, that 
right is only that of the people against the national and state governments,33 
and private actors are fully within their purview to limit firearm exposure 
on their own land.34 Scholars nonetheless refer to Heller as a “limelight” 
                                                                                                             
 27. The National Rifle Association in the years preceding 2008 began to push 
for the individualist view of the Second Amendment in its lobbying of Congress and 
state legislatures and financing of presidential elections. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun 
Law, Policy and Politics, 84 N.Y. ST. B.A. J., July-Aug. 2012, at 35, 35 (defining 
the individualist view as one that the Second Amendment grants a personal right to 
keep and bear arms to civilians, not just those individuals in a “militia”); Garry 
Mathiason & Andrea R. Milano, “Bring Your Gun to Work” Laws and Workplace 
Violence Prevention, 60 FED. LAW. 60, 61 (2013).  
 28. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 29. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. II.  
 30. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 
553 (1875) (holding that the right to possess firearms existed only for those citizens 
in a state militia). 
 31. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
 32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591. 
 33. Id. at 619−20. The Second Amendment also is effective as to state actors 
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 34. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“An individual’s right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment, whatever 
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case because the decision brought the Second Amendment squarely within 
the public’s attention.35 With the subsequent focus on a citizen’s right to 
bear arms, 12 additional states passed Parking Lot laws.36 These statutes 
went “beyond the [traditional] protection of an individual’s right to keep 
arms in the home” to include the right to keep arms on another’s private 
property.37 The following sections distill the general provisions and 
various limitations of Parking Lot laws and identify those instances in 
which courts upheld the constitutionality of some of the statutes. 
A. Parking Lot Laws Vary, but Policy Does Not 
Parking Lot laws purport to protect gun owners’ rights on the private 
property of others and, in so doing, limit employers’ and other property 
owners’ property interests.38 These statutes either “prohibit property 
owners from banning the storage of firearms locked in vehicles located on 
the owner’s property”39 or forbid employers from “establish[ing], 
maintain[ing], or enforc[ing] any policy or rule that has the effect of 
allowing such employer or its agents to search the locked privately owned 
vehicles of employees or invited guests on the employer’s parking lot . . . 
.”40 The statutes give employees the right to store firearms in their vehicles 
on a company’s private property.41 Pursuant to these laws, employers may 
                                                                                                             
its full scope, certainly must be limited by the equally fundamental right of a private 
property owner to exercise exclusive dominion and control over its land.”). 
 35. Stowell, supra note 24, at 523. 
 36. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2013); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 
(2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2009); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2009); 430 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65 (2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2010); ME. STAT. 
tit. 26, § 600 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-13 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
39-17-1313 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-312 (2015); TEX. LABOR CODE 
ANN. § 52.061 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103 (West 2009); WIS. 
STAT. § 175.60(15m) (2014). 
 37. Stowell, supra note 24, at 521−22. 
 38. Some statutes not only govern private and public employers but also 
affect the rights of other property owners, such as landlords, municipalities, and 
others. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135. 
 39. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 40. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(a). 
 41. Employees are just one group that has the right to store firearms in their 
vehicles, subject to some exceptions; for instance, invitees and/or customers may 
also store firearms on another’s private parking lot in some states. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 18.65.800(a) (stating “an individual”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 
(stating “a person”); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4) (stating “any customer, employee, or 
invitee”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13. 
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not implement policies that effectively ban the storage of guns at the 
workplace, a restriction that infringes on their rights as private property 
owners to use their land and exclude things or persons from it.42 To 
somewhat compensate for this infringement, if an incident were to occur 
as a result of firearm storage on the premises—like the violence at Black 
& Decker—more than half of Parking Lot laws dictate the employer 
cannot be held civilly liable for any resulting injuries or damages.43 
If an employer bars gun storage on its property in an effort to avoid 
workplace violence injuries, however, it would violate the Parking Lot law 
and could result in criminal44 or civil liability.45 Conversely, the majority 
of Parking Lot laws lack a private enforcement mechanism for individuals 
harmed by a company policy illegally banning firearms.46 Parking Lot 
laws in 15 states fail to grant explicitly a right of action to employees who 
are directly harmed as a result of unlawful company policies.47 Though 
                                                                                                             
 42. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 138 (1765) (“The third 
absolute right, inherent in every [man], is that of property: which consists in the 
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or 
diminution . . . .”). The right of property, from the time of Blackstone, has included 
the right to use and exercise dominion over one’s property “in total exclusion of 
the right of any other individual in the universe.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *2; see also Merrill, supra note 15, at 745 (“There is strong 
evidence that, with respect to interests in land, the right to exclude is the first right 
to emerge in primitive property rights systems . . . .”). 
 43. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(c); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(5)(b); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(e); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(B) (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 
26, § 600(2) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(5) (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 62.1-02-13(3); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a(B), 1290.22(E) (2017); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1313(b) (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-104 (West 
2017); WIS. STAT. §175.60(21)(c) (2017). 
 44. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251; GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18) (2017); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1289.7a,1290.22; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1313, 50-1-312. 
 45. Employers may be held civilly liable in a civil or administrative action 
commenced by the state’s Attorney General. See FLA. STAT. 790.251(6); see also 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-106. 
 46. See discussion infra Part II.A. Only Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee speak to possible civil actions for employees 
to enforce Parking Lot laws. See infra Part II.A. 
 47. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (2017); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65 (2017); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10 (2017); LA. REV. 
STAT. § 32:292.1; ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 45-9-55; NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441 (2017); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061 
(West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103; WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m). 
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these Parking Lot laws purport to extend the right to keep arms to a 
company’s parking lot, most statutes do not provide employees with the 
tools to protect their rights. 
1. Guns on Company Property: Who, What, When, Where, How 
Limitations 
Parking Lot laws confer the right to store guns on company property, 
but this right is not absolute, as the statutes contain many limitations. 
These limitations are categorized in the following way: (1) gun 
requirements; (2) limits on location; (3) vehicle requirements; (4) 
employee requirements; and (5) alternative solutions for employers. First, 
the guns stored in parking lots must be legal and out of sight.48 Second, if 
the employer’s business is one requiring a certain level of safety, the 
employer may nonetheless ban firearms.49 Parking Lot laws also generally 
require that the employee’s vehicle be locked and properly parked on 
company property.50 Many Parking Lot laws mandate that employees who 
                                                                                                             
 48. Many statutes require that the gun be “lawfully possessed” by the 
employee, meaning that the gun is properly registered and the employee is 
licensed in accordance with state gun laws. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-11-
90(b); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a). Some Parking 
Lot laws require the gun be kept out of plain view. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-
11-90(b)(3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(A)(2); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 
65(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2(A); ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600(1); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-17-1313(a)(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(1)(a)(iii). 
 49. Such locations include the following: nuclear generating stations, see ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(5); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
11-135(d)(3); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 65(a)(22); schools, see FLA. STAT. § 
790.251(7)(a); MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18)(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(1)(a); 
hospitals, see N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(g) (2017); correctional 
facilities, see FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-35(d)(2); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2(b)(2); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(5)(b) (West 2017); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-107; on or 
near a military base, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(7); U.S. government 
property, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(5)(a); where national defense, 
aerospace, homeland security occur, see FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(d); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-11-135(d)(4); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 65(a)(19) (where one cannot carry a 
firearm into parking area of “airport”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(c); or 
where activities involving explosives occur, see FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(e); N.D. 
CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(d). 
 50. The vehicle or the compartments of the vehicle containing the firearm must 
be locked according to the following state Parking Lot laws: ALA. CODE § 13A-11-
90(b)(3); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(A)(1); 
FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66 / 65(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-
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wish to store guns must have a valid permit for the gun51 or meet certain 
criteria for gun possession.52 An employee must meet any or all of the first 
four types of requirements, depending on the state.53 Failure to do so would 
give the employer the right to enforce an otherwise unlawful ban or void 
the employee’s right to keep arms on company property.54 
In addition to gun, location, vehicle, and employee requirements, 
employers in several states can take certain actions to further limit firearm 
storage in the company parking area.55 For instance, an employer can 
provide extra security for parking lots,56 post signage stating “no 
                                                                                                             
28-7-2(a); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(A); ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600(1); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 69-2441(3); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(1)(a); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, §§ 1289.7a(A), 1290.22(B) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1313(a)(2)(B); 
TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(1)(a)(ii). This 
requirement applies only to employees’ vehicles because an employer can always 
ban firearm storage in company vehicles. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(b); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(2); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(f); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
11-135(c)(2); IDAHO CODE § 5-341; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2(a); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-7c10(b); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(2); ME. STAT. tit. 26 § 600(1); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(4); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 62.1-02-13(6)(e); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; WIS. STAT. § 
175.60(15m)(b). In some states, the employee must have general permission from 
his employer to park his vehicle in the company parking area and therefore store his 
firearm in his vehicle. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(b)(2); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-17-1313(a)(1). 
 51. ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(3) (when 
referencing “permitholder”). 
 52. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(b)(1). 
 53. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781; GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-135; IDAHO CODE § 5-341; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 66 / 65; IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10; LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1; 
ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600; MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55; 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061; UTAH CODE ANN. § 
34-45-103; WIS. STAT. § 175.60(15m). 
 54. See supra note 53. 
 55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
781(C)(3)(a)−(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(2); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781(C)(8); LA. 
REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(2)(a)(i). 
 56. In a handful of states, an employer who restricts or limits access to its lots 
like with a gate or a guard may maintain and enforce a policy preventing storage of 
firearms. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-781(C)(3)(a)−(b); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3); MISS. CODE § 
45-9-55(2). Similarly, if an employer provides an alternate lot for employees who 
wish to store guns in their cars that is “reasonably” close to the normal parking areas, 
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firearms,”57 or provide alternative storage for firearms.58 When an 
employer takes one of those steps, he may continue to ban firearms from 
areas with extra security, signage, or alternative storage.59 The intricacies 
of the Parking Lot laws are numerous and varying, yet the root of this 
legislation is the elevation of employees’ right to keep arms in their 
vehicles above employers’ interests in property and safety of the work 
environment. 
B. Parking Lot Laws Held Constitutional, yet Subject to Criticism 
Employers challenged some of the statutes in courts across the nation 
on constitutional grounds.60 Employers asserted that the Parking Lot laws 
were unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) they effected a “taking 
without just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause;61 (2) the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH 
Act”)62 preempted the state Parking Lot laws; (3) the statutes distinguished 
between businesses without a rational basis for the distinction; and (4) the 
statutes were unconstitutionally vague. Despite the employers’ best 
arguments, courts largely upheld Parking Lot laws.63 
1. Constitutionality Under the Takings Clause 
Because Parking Lot laws limit employers’ right to use and exclude 
from their land, challengers argued the statutes amounted to a “taking” 
under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.64 In the 2009 case of 
                                                                                                             
the employer may restrict storage in the normal parking area. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
781(C)(8); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b); UTAH CODE § 34-45-103(2)(a)(i). 
 57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22(D) (2017). 
 58. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-781(C)(3)(c). 
 59. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-
781(C)(3)(a)−(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1); LA. REV. STAT. § 
32:292.1(D)(3); MISS. CODE § 45-9-55(2); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-781(C)(8); 
LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b); UTAH CODE § 34-45-103(2)(a)(i). 
 60. See Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); Fla. 
Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 61. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 62. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012).  
 63. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.–3. 
 64. See Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1208; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1289−90; see also U.S. CONST. amend V. 
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Ramsey Winch v. Henry,65 the United States Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reviewed Oklahoma’s Parking Lot law that imposed criminal 
liability on property owners.66 The employer, Whirlpool, brought the 
initial action alleging the statute’s unconstitutionality on several grounds 
and sought a permanent injunction against the statute’s enforcement.67 
Whirlpool argued that restricting an employer’s property interest and right 
to use his land constituted a taking.68 The court reasoned that merely 
prohibiting all property owners from making certain usages of their land 
did not constitute a per se taking or a taking under the Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. City of New York factors.69 Instead, the court 
analogized the case to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.70 In PruneYard, the Court did not 
find a taking when California’s constitution prohibited a private shopping 
                                                                                                             
 65. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d 1199. 
 66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.7a(A) (2009). 
 67. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1202−03. 
 68. Id. at 1208−09. Whirlpool also argued that Oklahoma’s statute was 
unconstitutional because (1) it was preempted by the OSH Act; and (2) it was 
unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. 
The Ramsey court did not afford much weight to the vagueness claim because a 
state law must be facially vague to be declared unconstitutional. Id. at 1211 n.11. 
Based on the particular facts of the case, the court determined that the statute was 
not unconstitutionally vague. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1209−10. Traditional takings occur when the government 
physically occupies land. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). When regulations are involved, however, a taking may nonetheless 
still occur. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). There are two 
types of regulatory takings in which some governmental regulation is such that it 
effects a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Penn. Coal Co., 260 
U.S. at 414−15. First, a Penn Central taking occurs when a consideration of the 
following factors demonstrates that a regulation goes so far as to deprive a 
landowner of land use: (1) the magnitude of the economic impact sustained by 
landowner; (2) whether the landowner relied on old law or regulations such that 
investment-backed expectations were impacted; and (3) the character of 
government action, that is, whether it is similar to a traditional taking and targeted 
towards a few landowners. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978). Second, a per se taking is one in which the Penn Central factors 
are considered automatically satisfied; these takings include when a government 
permanently and physically occupies private land and when a regulation deprives 
a landowner of all reasonable economic uses. See Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432−33 (1982); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 70. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1207 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)). 
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center from banning free speech in the form of petition circulation.71 The 
Ramsey court determined that circumventing the shopping center’s right 
to exclude in PruneYard is similar to the Parking Lot laws’ circumvention 
of the employer’s right to ban guns from its property.72 Ultimately, the 
Ramsey court found that the plaintiffs had “not suffered an unconstitutional 
infringement of their property rights, but rather [were] required by the 
Amendments to recognize a state-protected right of their employees.”73 This 
Tenth Circuit decision is representative of lower courts’ refusals to find an 
unconstitutional taking.74 
2. Constitutional Because No Federal Preemption 
Multiple courts likewise have found Parking Lot laws constitutional 
despite employers’ claims that the federal scheme set forth in the OSH Act 
preempted such laws.75 When a federal law either expressly or implicitly 
preempts a state law, courts invalidate the state law.76 One of the main 
                                                                                                             
 71. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84. 
 72. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1207. 
 73. Id. at 1209; see also Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 1281, 1289−90 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 74. No other federal courts of appeals have examined the constitutionality of 
Parking Lot laws on takings grounds. See, e.g., Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
1281. Contrary to the Tenth Circuit and Florida district court’s findings, one law 
review comment suggests that Parking Lot laws do, in fact, effect an unconstitutional 
taking. Stefanie L. Steines, Comment, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault on Private-
Property Rights and Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1171 (2008). The 
commentator examined the Penn Central factors and determined that they “appear to 
weigh in favor of finding of a taking” for three reasons: (1) an increase in workplace 
violence increases economic costs for the employer; (2) the “investment-backed 
expectations” prong is inconclusive in determining a taking; and (3) some statutes 
impose criminal liability. Id. at 1189−96. Courts, however, have yet to adopt this 
reasoning, and the statutes are presumed constitutional on takings grounds. 
 75. See Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d 1199; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281. 
 76. Preemption occurs because the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution provides, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Express preemption occurs when a 
federal statute either contains a preemption clause explicitly identifying which 
state laws or regulations will be affected or contains some other clear statement 
of congressional intent to preempt, thus giving states clear areas in which to 
operate. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111−12 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Implied preemption can take multiple forms: (1) direct 
conflict; (2) indirect conflict; and (3) field preemption. Direct conflict exists most 
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types of implied preemption is field preemption, which occurs when a 
regulatory scheme is so complex and far-reaching that “no room remains 
for the operation of state law at all.”77 In such a case, courts infer that 
Congress meant to occupy that particular field in its entirety.78 As such, 
although a gap may exist in that comprehensive scheme, the breadth of 
federal law implies that Congress meant to govern that gap.79 
Opponents of Parking Lot laws claimed that the OSH Act is an example 
of field preemption because the Act aims to ensure safe workplaces.80 The 
OSH Act contains a plethora of “occupational safety and health standards 
for businesses” to ensure safe work environments.81 Given the overall goal 
of the OSH Act, employers argued that state Parking Lot laws implicate 
issues for workplace violence, an aspect of the safe working environment82 
that Congress aimed to protect with the OSH Act.83 In two notable cases, 
courts disagreed with employers, holding that the OSH Act does not 
preempt Parking Lot laws for two main reasons: the Act lacks specific 
standards for workplace violence84 and the impetus for the Act’s enactment 
was not to curb workplace violence but only “traditional work-related 
hazards.”85 Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
                                                                                                             
clearly when a party cannot possibly comply with both the state and federal law. 
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009). Indirect conflict involves a more 
difficult analysis and exists when the animating policies of the federal law are 
undermined by the state counterpart. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 
51, 64 (2002). 
 77. Cook v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 790 F.3d 1088, 1093 (10th Cir. 2015). 
See Thomas H. Sosnowski, Narrowing the Field: The Case Against Implied Field 
Preemption of State Product Liability Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2286, 2295−98 
(2013); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227−28 (2000); see also 
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012). 
 78. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401 (“[F]ield preemption reflects a 
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is 
parallel to federal standards.”). 
 79. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Research Conservation & Dev. 
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983). 
 80. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1203 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012)); Fla. 
Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281. 
 81. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3)). 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). 
 83. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1202; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. 
 84. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1208; Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. 
 85. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205. The Ramsey court relied on Congress’s 
policy statement to bolster its “traditional work-related hazards.” Id. The OSH 
Act’s preamble states, “Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising 
out of work situations impose a substantial burden upon . . . interstate commerce 
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(“OSHA”)86 issued voluntary workplace violence guidelines, the Tenth 
Circuit declined to find that those guidelines constituted federal 
preemption.87 Instead, the court determined that the issuance of guidelines, 
as opposed to a specific standard, signaled that neither OSHA nor Congress 
intended to preempt state regulation.88 Despite the OSH Act’s general duty 
clause requiring employers to maintain a hazard free work environment,89 
the court reasoned the clause could not preempt because it was overbroad.90 
After these opinions in 2011, however, OSHA articulated an interest 
in overseeing workplace violence.91 OSHA issued a manual providing 
                                                                                                             
in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability 
compensation payments.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, 
Congress aimed “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in 
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). 
 86. OSHA is the administrative agency charged with enforcement of the OSH 
Act. About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. (2016), 
https://www.osha.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/FJ4D-Y4XM]. 
 87. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. 
 88. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205. 
 89. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1). 
 90. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1205. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1298−99. These courts’ findings are consistent with that of one commentator 
who argued that the OSH Act does not preempt Parking Lot laws because OSHA 
has yet to articulate a standard for workplace violence and states are not foreclosed 
from regulating such areas. Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave 
it in the Parking Lot: Why the OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work 
Laws, 61 FLA. L. REV 475, 491−92 (2009). The commentator found Congress’s 
statement that “nothing in the OSH Act prevents states from regulating where no 
federal standard is in place” to be dispositive. Id at 509 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)). 
 91. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OR INSPECTING WORKPLACE 
VIOLENCE (2011). This directive issued in 2011, of course, postdates many of the 
state Parking Lot laws. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-781 (2009); FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 
(2008); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (2010); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1 (2008); 
MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55 (2006); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 62.1-02-13 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-2441 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21 § 1289.7a (2004); TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 52.061 (West 2011); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 34-45-103 (West 2009). If a court were to find preemption based on 
congressional intent to preempt, however, even those laws pre-directive would be 
supplanted. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Motier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991). Therefore, 
the timing of the federal and state laws’ enactment does not pose an issue for 
preemption because even if a federal law, or in this case an agency manual, post-
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guidance for industries with a high risk of workplace violence and directed 
its personnel to investigate all workplace homicides.92 One commentator 
reviewed Texas’s Parking Lot law in light of the OSHA manual, finding 
that unlicensed gun owners are not vetted and consequently might be 
considered a workplace hazard under the OSH Act.93 The author determined 
accordingly that the new OSHA workplace violence regulation might 
indicate enough congressional purpose to support a finding that the general 
duty clause of the OSH Act does in fact preempt the Texas statute.94 
Although no court has considered the manual and statutes together to date, 
it is possible that a court could find that the OSHA 2011 manual preempts 
state Parking Lot laws.95 
3. Unconstitutional When Statutes Distinguish Between Businesses 
Notwithstanding the strong arguments for and against federal 
preemption of Parking Lot laws, one court declared a state statute 
unconstitutional on the basis of distinction.96 In Florida Retail Federation, 
Inc. v. Attorney General of Florida, a federal district court held the Florida 
statute unconstitutional because the statute treated businesses with 
concealed-carry permitted employees and businesses without concealed-
                                                                                                             
dates the Parking Lot law, the state law still would be preempted and precluded 
from enforcement. Wis. Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 605. 
 92. Brian G. Redburn, The Texas Parking Lot Law: Why Overbroad Legislative 
Drafting Makes Chapter 52 of the Texas Labor Code Uniquely Susceptible to 
Constitutional Challenges After the New OSHA Workplace Violence Regulations, 
19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 761, 777−78 (2013) (citing ENFORCEMENT 
PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OR INSPECTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, supra 
note 91). Industries are classified as high-risk for violence based on several factors: 
(1) whether work deals with public or “unstable people”; (2) whether work is 
isolated; (3) whether work involves money and valuables; (4) whether work 
provides service or care; (5) whether the workplace serves alcohol; and (6) “the time 
of day and location of work.” ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING OR 
INSPECTING WORKPLACE VIOLENCE, supra note 91, at Abstract-1. 
 93. Redburn, supra note 92, at 779. 
 94. Id. at 781. 
 95. As of February 15, 2018. 
 96. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y. Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 
(N.D. Fla. 2008). A state statute’s distinction or classification is unconstitutional 
when the distinction is not “rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.” U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[N]or shall any State . . 
. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
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carry permitted employees differently.97 Although a business owner 
without concealed-carry permitted workers could ban firearms from its 
parking lots, businesses with at least one worker with a concealed-carry 
permit could not.98 The court held this distinction unconstitutional, stating 
that “without any rational basis, the statute’s provision on guns in 
customer vehicles subjects some businesses to an obligation and 
competitive disadvantage that otherwise-identically-situated businesses 
do not face.”99 Today, no Parking Lot laws contain such a distinction.100 
The handful of employers’ challenges to Parking Lot laws have been 
unsuccessful.101 When a court declared a Parking Lot law unconstitutional 
on grounds of distinction,102 the court still held that a state can force a 
business to allow guns on to its parking lots.103 Despite some commentators’ 
arguments that the statutes were or are currently unconstitutional, courts 
have yet to be presented with such a challenge. 
II. ACTIONABLE VIOLATIONS OF PARKING LOT LAWS 
Assuming Parking Lot laws are constitutional, the question remains as 
to whether the existence of those statutes provides an employee terminated 
for violating a company’s unlawful firearm ban with a right to recover 
damages. The employment relationship is always contractual,104 whether 
the parties form a contract with a duration of employment or rely on the 
at-will default presumption that exists in 49 states and the District of 
                                                                                                             
 97. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (examining FLA. STAT. § 
790.251 (2008)). 
 98. Id. The statute was problematic for employers who wished to ban 
customers from storing firearms on their lots and was practically difficult to enforce 
because workers and permit status could change frequently. Id. at 1291−92. 
 99. Id. at 1293. 
 100. See supra note 12. 
 101. See Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009); Fla. 
Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281. The legislature did not remove the 
unconstitutional portion but rather just ignores the unconstitutional distinction. 
See FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2017). 
 102. Fla. Retail Fed’n, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. 
 103. See id. at 1301. 
 104. “At its core, employment is a contractual relationship. The law of contracts 
rests on a series of default rules,” like the at-will doctrine. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T 
LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). Therefore, parties may contract for 
different terms to rebut the at-will presumption. Id.; see also Stacy Gray, Note, 
Futch v. McAllister Towing, Inc.: Transforming the Punitory Effect of a Breach of 
the Employee Duty of Loyalty?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 927, 929−30 (2000). 
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Columbia.105 The ability of the parties in an at-will employment 
relationship to terminate employment at any time allows the employer in 
particular to act arbitrarily.106 As a result, the parties, state statutes, and 
common law can modify the at-will employment default rules to curtail 
potential arbitrariness.107 For example, the parties may circumvent the 
uncertainty of at-will employment by varying these default rules via a 
separate contract identifying the terms and conditions of employment.108 
When parties fail to vary the at-will default presumption, the parties must 
rely on statutory or common-law tort actions to recover for wrongful 
termination.109 
A. Express Rights of Action Within Parking Lot Laws 
A minority of states’ Parking Lot laws grant such a statutory 
remedy.110 Six statutes explicitly grant an employee a right of action 
against an employer who violates their provisions.111 In these states, the 
legislatures proactively articulated an exception to at-will employment112 
                                                                                                             
 105. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); see also 
Barton v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 171 So. 3d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 2016). See 
Kenneth R. Swift, The Public Policy Exception: Time to Retire a Noble Warrior?, 
61 MERCER L. REV. 551, 554 (2010). See, e.g., Schultea v. Wood, 27 F.3d 1112, 
1116 (5th Cir. 1994); Ridenhour v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Ex parte Michelin N. Am., Inc., 795 So. 2d 674, 677 (Ala. 
2001). Montana is the one state that does not default to at-will employment. See 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2017). The state has a comprehensive 
statutory regime granting the exclusive right of wrongful discharge. MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914. This regime requires good cause to fire an employee. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b). Montana defines good cause as “reasonable 
job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job 
duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other legitimate business 
reason.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5). 
 106. Carson, supra note 20, at 562. At any time and without reason, the 
employer or employee might decide to end employment. 
 107. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 108. See Place v. Conn. Coll., 2013 WL 3388744, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013). 
 109. See discussion supra Part II; see also William R. Corbett, An Outrageous 
Response to “You’re Fired!”, 92 N.C. L. REV. 17, 22 (2013). 
 110. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(g) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(e) 
(2017); KY. REV. STAT. § 237.106(4) (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-
13(1)(e) & (5) (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.7a(C) (2017); TENN. CODE § 
50-1-312(A−B) (2017). 
 111. See supra note 110. 
 112. If there is a public policy and a remedy is provided by statute, inquiry into 
the wrongful discharge tort ceases. See discussion infra Part V.A.  
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by providing employees with a mechanism to enforce the Parking Lot 
laws’ provisions.113 Employees may file suit for damages, thereby 
protecting the employee from termination, discrimination, or other adverse 
actions on the basis of firearm storage.114 Though all six statutes give 
employees a right of action, only Florida’s law does not do so explicitly. 
Instead, Florida’s Parking Lot law merely prohibits an employer from 
terminating employees who exercise their constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms, which has been interpreted to create an implied right of action.115 
Overall, these six statutes grant an action to terminated employees separate 
from that provided by other statutes and tort law. 
B. Blow the Whistle to Get a Remedy 
Another statutory exception to the at-will presumption is the 
whistleblower status of the employee.116 State and federal statutes117 
enshrine the whistleblower exception, providing a cause of action to 
terminated employees who report an employer’s illegal activities.118 There 
are four major types of remedies that federal and state whistleblower 
statutes afford: (1) those based on retaliation against whistleblowers; (2) 
those that reward whistleblowers for speaking out; (3) those that reward 
employers for investigating potential illegal acts and protecting 
whistleblowers; and (4) those that punish a potential whistleblower’s 
                                                                                                             
 113. The six states are Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
and Tennessee. See supra note 110. 
 114. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90(g); KY. REV. STAT. § 237.106(4); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-13(1)(e) & (5); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1289.7a(C); TENN. 
CODE § 50-1-312(A)−(B). 
 115. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(e). One employee who brought an action under 
this statute, however, was unsuccessful because the facts of the case did not fall 
squarely within the statute. See Bruley v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 
1381, 1385 (M.D. Fla. 2008). The court did recognize that the Parking Lot law 
“create[d] an exception to at-will employment to prevent an employer from firing 
an employee for possessing a firearm in the employee’s car while on company 
property.” Bruley, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1386. This statement seemingly implies a 
right of action, but it has yet to be expounded upon by the courts. In the instant 
case, because the plaintiff-employee grabbed his gun from his apartment at the 
complex he also worked for, he could not utilize the Parking Lot law to recover. 
Bruley, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1383−84. 
 116. Swift, supra note 105, at 557. 
 117. Most notable is the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 151−169 (2012). 
 118. Julie Jones, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad 
Interpretation of the Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 
34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1137 (2003). 
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inaction.119 These statutes constitute an exception to at-will employment 
because whistleblowers have a “legitimate and respected desire to enforce 
laws and regulations” and therefore should not be penalized for following 
that desire.120 State whistleblower statutes vary greatly, however, resulting 
in a “patchwork” of laws across the nation.121 In some states, what is often 
referred to as a whistleblower statute acts as a codification of the common-
law tort action for WDVPP.122 One such state statute is Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 23:967. Although generally called a “whistleblower” statute,123 
this statute goes beyond the traditional protections that similar statutes 
afford by making a termination actionable if an employee objects or 
refuses to participate in his employer’s illegal acts.124 
Whistleblower statutes are related to the tort of WDVPP125 in that the 
former are predicated on the notion that when society declares conduct 
illegal, it also is identifying a public policy that could be the basis for a 
WDVPP claim.126 Where whistleblower statutes and public policy differ 
is that whistleblower statutes provide a remedy to encourage employees to 
report an employer’s illegal acts that harm the public in some way.127 In 
many ways, states often embrace whistleblower statutes over WDVPP 
because they are narrower, providing specific instances in which a remedy 
                                                                                                             
 119. Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-House 
Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities 
Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3356 (2014). 
 120. Jones, supra note 118, at 1138; see also Protecting Employees At Will 
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 
1933−34 (1983); Venessa F. Kuhlmann-Macro, Blowing the Whistle on the 
Employment-at-will Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 339, 340 (1992). 
 121. Christopher Wiener, Blowing the Whistle on Van Asdale: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 531, 536 (2010). For further discussion of the 
murky whistleblower statutes, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? 
Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes−Oxley Act 
for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1087−1121, Appendix A (2004) 
(summarizing all 50 states’ employment exceptions). 
 122. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (2017). 
 123. See Accardo v. La. Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 943 So. 2d 381 passim 
(La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 124. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967. 
 125. See, e.g., Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1998) (labeling Missouri’s whistleblower exception a second category of public 
policy exception); Moyer v. Allen Freight Lines, Inc., 885 P.2d 391, 393 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1994) (“Kansas courts have recognized several public policy exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine . . . [o]ne . . . is called the whistle-blower’s exception.”). 
 126. See Jones, supra note 118, at 1146. 
 127. See id. 
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is available.128 Conversely, the public policy exception often is ambiguous 
and unpredictable,129 depending on the state’s approach to sources of 
public policy.130 
C. The Tort of WDVPP: Common yet Complicated 
The tort of WDVPP is not defined uniformly among the states, and some 
states fail to recognize it at all.131 Those courts that do recognize WDVPP hold 
“that certain terminations [are] counterproductive to the broader social 
welfare, and with that came the rise of the public policy exception . . . .”132 
Consequently, if an employee’s termination offends some “well-established 
public policy,” the tort of wrongful discharge is available.133 Such well-
established public policies may be found in state constitutions, statutes, 
jurisprudence, and administrative regulations, among other sources.134 
Most states recognize some form of this exception,135 but some scholars 
have questioned its utility because it “has been pleaded by employees in 
cases in which public policy was not clearly implicated.”136 In an effort to 
solidify what an employee must prove to bring a WDVPP claim, Professor 
                                                                                                             
 128. See id. at 1147. 
 129. “‘Public policy’ is an amorphous concept.” Danny v. Laidlaw Transit 
Servs., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 145 (Wash. 2008). 
 130. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 131. “A clear majority of jurisdictions recognizes such a limit when the 
employer discharges an employee in violation of a well-established public policy.” 
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 132. Swift, supra note 105, at 556. 
 133. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). What 
constitutes a well-established public policy varies among states, but some general 
examples of such policies include employees’ rights to file workman’s compensation 
claims or to report safety habits. Kashif Haque, The At-Will Employment Rule and Its 
Impact on Wrongful Discharge Cases, 2013 WL 5290494 (Oct. 2013). 
 134. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 135. Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 21.  
 136. Swift, supra note 105, at 565−66 (“[T]he public policy exception is now 
‘intended merely to provide a modicum of judicial protection for those who did 
not already have a means of challenging their dismissals under state law.’” (citing 
Van Kruinigen v. Plan B, L.L.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 92, 96 (D. Conn. 2007))). 
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Henry Perritt enumerated the following elements: clarity;137 jeopardy;138 
causation;139 and overriding justification.140 Although this elemental 
approach to public policy is relatively simple and efficient, only Iowa, Ohio, 
and Washington adopted Perritt’s elements.141 Instead, many states are 
unclear and vary in their approaches to determining public policy for the 
tort.142 
Employment-at-will is deeply ingrained in American employment 
law; it forms the basis for the majority of employment relationships.143 The 
at-will presumption benefits employers and employees because either can 
terminate the employment relationship at any time.144 This benefit, 
however, does not outweigh the great potential for unpredictability in 
employment. Accordingly, several statutory and common-law exceptions 
exist to curtail the arbitrary aspect of at-will employment.145 In the context 
of Parking Lot laws, there are three potential routes for employee 
recovery: (1) a grant of action in the Parking Lot law; (2) a whistleblower 
action; and (3) a WDVPP claim. As to the third route, the recent Fifth 
Circuit opinion in Swindol v. Aurora Sciences Flight Corp. examines 
whether a terminated employee may base a WDVPP claim on a Parking 
Lot law violation.146 
                                                                                                             
 137. See Henry. H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: 
Where does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 398−99 (1989) 
(“That a clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or federal 
constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law . . . .”).  
 138. Id. at 399 (“That dismissing employees under circumstances like those 
involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy . . . .”). 
 139. See id. (“The plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the 
public policy . . . .”). 
 140. Id. (“The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for 
the dismissal . . . .”).  
 141. See Lower v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 770, 775 (S.D. Ohio 
2007); Raymond v. U.S.A. Healthcare Ctr. Fort Dodge, L.L.C., 468 F. Supp. 2d 
1047, 1057 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Leininger v. Pioneer Nat’l Latex, 875 N.E.2d 36, 40 
(Ohio 2007); Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996). 
 142. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 143. See Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 21. 
 144. Fleming, supra note 19, at 437; see also Tolmie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
930 F.2d 579, 580 (7th Cir. 1991); Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 805 F.3d 
516 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 145. See discussion supra Part II. 
 146. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 832 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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III. SWINDOL V. AURORA SCIENCES FLIGHT CORP.: THE RIGHT OUTCOME 
FOR MISSISSIPPI 
In its examination of Mississippi’s WDVPP and Parking Lot law, the 
Fifth Circuit became the first court to hold that a terminated employee 
could base a WDVPP action on a violation of a Parking Lot law.147 
Aurora’s Mississippi management fired employee Robert Swindol for 
violating a company ban on firearms on company property when he stored 
his firearm in his truck parked in the company parking lot.148 Swindol 
brought suit in the Northern District of Mississippi, alleging WDVPP and 
defamation.149 In support of his WDVPP claim, Swindol cited to the 
Mississippi Parking Lot law and urged the court to interpret the statute so 
as to “create a separate and additional public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine.”150 
The district court dismissed Swindol’s wrongful discharge claim, 
reasoning that the Mississippi Parking Lot law did not provide an 
exception to at-will employment.151 The district court instead held that 
Mississippi law recognized only two such exceptions: (1) a “‘narrow 
public policy exception’” mirroring a whistleblower exception; and (2) the 
policy manual exception, pursuant to which a terminated employee 
possesses a right to sue if the termination was in violation of the company 
policy manual.152 Swindol appealed to the Fifth Circuit, maintaining his 
position that Mississippi’s Parking Lot law should be interpreted to “create 
a separate and additional public policy exception to the at-will doctrine 
because doing so would fortify Mississippi’s public policy supporting the 
right to bear arms.”153 Although the court agreed that the Parking Lot law 
“clearly expresses a public policy prohibiting employers from barring 
employees from possessing firearms,”154 the Fifth Circuit declined to carve 
                                                                                                             
 147. Id. 
 148. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 2014 WL 4914089, at *1 (N.D. Miss. 2014). 
 149. Swindol, 832 F.3d at 493. 
 150. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(internal quotations omitted). Similar to other Parking Lot laws, Mississippi’s statute 
provides, in pertinent part, “a public or private employer may not establish, maintain, 
or enforce any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting a person from 
transporting or storing a firearm in a locked vehicle in any parking lot, parking garage, 
or other designated parking area.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55(1) (2017). 
 151. Swindol, 2014 WL 4914089, at *4. 
 152. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted). 
 153. Swindol, 805 F.3d at 521 (internal citations omitted). 
 154. Id. at 522. 
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out such an exception and certified a question to the Mississippi Supreme 
Court.155 
Much like Swindol’s proposed interpretation, the Fifth Circuit’s 
certified question asked whether the Mississippi Parking Lot law created 
an additional and completely separate exception to at-will employment 
from the normal public policy exception.156 The Mississippi Supreme 
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s wording of its certified question, 
maintaining that the statute did not warrant a separate at-will exception 
because the Mississippi Legislature’s mere passage of the Parking Lot law 
created a public policy to be enforced with the tort of WDVPP.157 
Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided that the state’s 
constitution also sets forth a protectable public policy in the right to keep 
and bear arms.158 
Upon receipt of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s answer, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that Swindol had a cognizable WDVPP claim under 
Mississippi law.159 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the [supreme] court 
was holding that the relevant cause of action for discharging someone in 
violation of this statute is the same as that already recognized for wrongful 
discharges under [the narrow public policy exception case] McArn, 
namely, a tort action with the same categories of relief being available.”160 
As such, the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court’s dismissal and 
remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits because 
Mississippi common law recognizes WDVPP for a termination violating 
the Parking Lot law.161 
This decision marks the first time a court held a Parking Lot law 
actionable as providing the public policy for recovery under WDVPP. 
Prior to Swindol, courts examined only a wrongful discharge claim based 
on a Parking Lot law when the statute itself provided the employee with a 
                                                                                                             
 155. Upon a finding that diversity jurisdiction did exist despite Swindol’s 
deficient complaint, the Fifth Circuit certified the following question: “[w]hether 
in Mississippi an employer may be liable for a wrongful discharge of an employee 
for storing a firearm in a locked vehicle on company property in a manner that is 
consistent with Section 45-9-55.” Id. at 523. 
 156. Id. 
 157. “[T]he Legislature has declared it ‘legally impermissible’ for an employer to 
terminate an employee for having a firearm inside his locked vehicle on company 
property.” Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 194 So. 3d 847, 852−53 (Miss. 2017). 
 158. Id. at 853. 
 159. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 832 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 493. 
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cause of action.162 Courts continually declined to find a compelling public 
policy in the constitutional right to bear arms to warrant an exception to 
at-will employment.163 Even a federal court in Mississippi previously 
declined to create an exception based on the Parking Lot law alone.164 
Though the Swindol outcome only benefits Mississippi employees, it 
would be desirable for many non-Mississippi employees. 
IV. EMPLOYEE RECOVERY UNDER WDVPP AND WHISTLEBLOWER 
STATUTES 
The other 20 states with Parking Lot laws do not have precedents 
providing a WDVPP claim to gun-storing employees. Though other state 
courts have yet to reach a Swindol outcome, any state with a Parking Lot 
law and either a whistleblower statute or recognition of WDVPP possesses 
the tools to grant a right of action to an employee terminated for storing a 
gun in their vehicle. This section looks to the rationale behind recognition 
of WDVPP and whistleblower statutes. That very rationale supports a 
cognizable claim in the context of all Parking Lot laws. When a state 
neither recognizes WDVPP nor has a whistleblower statute, an employee 
terminated in violation of a Parking Lot law is left without recourse. 
A. Rationale of WDVPP 
The Swindol court did not speak directly to the justifications for its 
public policy exception, yet the very rationale behind even the narrowest 
exception demands that courts recognize Parking Lot laws as clear 
articulations of public policy.165 The basic proposition supporting the 
public policy exception is that “in a civilized state where reciprocal legal 
rights and duties abound the words ‘at will’ can never mean ‘without limit 
or qualification,’ . . . for in such a state the rights of each person are 
necessarily and inherently limited by the rights of others and the interests 
of the public.”166 When at-will employment rules value workforce 
flexibility, whatever occurs within the employment relationship must not 
                                                                                                             
 162. Bruley v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1385−86 (M.D. 
Fla. 2008). 
 163. See Bastible v. Wyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Plona v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 558 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2009); Hansen v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004). 
 164. Parker v. Leaf River Cellulose, L.L.C., 73 F. Supp. 3d 687, 692−93 (S.D. 
Miss. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 2016 WL 4245455, at *1 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 165. See Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sci. Corp., 194 So. 3d 847, 853 (Miss. 2016). 
 166. Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985). 
1014 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
offend the public interest.167 The public policy exception aims to “prohibit 
an employer from placing an employee in the position of keeping a job 
only by performing an illegal act, forsaking a public duty, or foregoing a 
job-related right or privilege.”168 
In examining a WDVPP claim, courts must conduct two analyses in 
every case.169 First, the court must establish that the discharge violates 
some well-established public policy.170 Second, the court must inquire as 
to whether there is an existing remedy protecting the employee’s and 
society’s interests.171 If no such remedy exists, then a claim for WDVPP 
is available.172 
First, the well-established public policy incorporated in Parking Lot 
laws is the individual right to keep and bear arms.173 Though a 
constitutional right limits only the power of federal and state governments 
to interfere with the exercise of that right,174 the mere enactment of a law 
giving employees the right to store firearms in their cars on private 
property indicates that those state legislatures value the right to keep and 
bear arms over employers’ property rights or safety concerns. Parking Lot 
laws themselves create a right to keep arms in a particular area 
independent from that of the state and federal constitutions.175 
Parking Lot laws’ public policy qualifies as “well-established” under 
any of the varying approaches to the public policy exception. The 
narrowest approach is the “unlawful” approach in which a wrongful 
discharge action only is available when the employee is fired for refusing 
to participate in or for reporting an employer’s illegal acts.176 Under the 
unlawful approach, the employee must demonstrate that his employer 
directed him to perform the illegal act.177 The unlawful approach also 
requires “an explicit statement of public policy in a statute that supports 
                                                                                                             
 167. Id. 
 168. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992).  
 169. Osborn v. Prof’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 679, 681 (W.D. Mo. 
1994) (internal citations omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 174. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 175. See Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y. Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 
1295 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (“I conclude that when the statute refers to the ‘constitutional’ 
right to bear arms, it means the right to bear arms created by § 790.251 itself.”). 
 176. Thomas L. Cluff, Jr., In Defense of a Narrow Public Policy Exception of 
the Employment At Will Rule, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 437, 449 (1996). 
 177. Id. 
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the specific interest the employee is asserting.”178 Parking Lot laws 
expressly prohibit company bans on firearm storage, thus making the 
maintenance or enforcement of such a ban illegal.179 Under the unlawful 
approach to identifying a well-established public policy, those 21 state 
legislatures that enacted Parking Lot laws articulated a well-established 
public policy that can be enforced via WDVPP.  
A more expansive approach to identifying actionable public policies 
is the “public purpose” approach, which “recognizes wrongful discharge 
actions for employees who can allege that their terminations harm the 
public good in any general manner.”180 This intermediate view requires “an 
explicit declaration of policy, but recognizes sources other than specific 
legislation, such as constitutional provisions . . . .”181 Under this approach, 
Parking Lot laws give terminated employees a wrongful discharge claim as 
well. An employee fired for bringing his gun to work and storing it in his 
vehicle need only prove by using any source of law that his termination 
harmed the public good.182 An employee could argue that by prohibiting 
him from storing firearms in contradiction with a state’s Parking Lot law, 
his termination harms the public good by infringing on a legislatively 
bestowed right and the right to self-defense.183 Therefore, the termination 
circumvents the people’s legislative will articulated in the Parking Lot law. 
The broadest approach to the public policy exception is the “just 
cause” approach, which bars any discharge that is not based on good 
cause.184 The “just cause” approach encompasses most wrongful discharge 
claims because it grants courts discretion in distilling public policy from 
any source of law.185 The breadth of this method undercuts the doctrine of 
at-will employment because no longer is “bad reason or no reason at all” 
sufficient to end the employment relationship.186 Reasoning a fortiori, if 
Parking Lot laws provide a strong and rooted public policy under the 
narrower approaches, the broadest approach must also result in a tort 
                                                                                                             
 178. Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to Hire: Attacking the Other Half 
of the Employment-At-Will Rule, 24 CONN. L. REV. 97, 104 (1991). 
 179. See supra note 12. 
 180. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 450. 
 181. Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104. 
 182. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 450; Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104. 
 183. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 184. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 453. 
 185. The court is not tied to only “legislatively enunciated polic[ies].” 
Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104 (internal quotations omitted). 
 186. This is an expansive approach, similar to “good cause” as defined in 
Montana’s comprehensive regime displacing at-will in that state entirely. See 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (2017).  
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action for WDVPP. The “just cause” view is that employers may not 
terminate employees for anything but good cause.187 Therefore, an 
employer who terminates an employee for keeping a gun in the employee 
parking area would not satisfy the just cause requirement.188 Good cause 
does not exist when an employee is fired for exercising a right in 
accordance with a state statute.189 After conducting this analysis for 
Parking Lot laws, there is a well-established public policy under all of the 
various approaches. Also, in the 15 states whose statutes do not provide 
an explicit cause of action, a statutory remedy for the employee does not 
exist. 
More state legislatures could have enacted specific remedies to avoid 
the public policy question;190 however, the fact that a state even recognizes 
WDVPP suggests that an express statutory remedy is not required in all 
instances.191 Assuming the legislatures know of the possibility of WDVPP, 
they likely intended for the common-law tort to fill the gap in the statutory 
regime. After all, the WDVPP action is a “common law cause of action to 
uphold policies established by legislatures,”192 and “the legislature has not 
and cannot cover every type of wrongful termination that violates a clear 
mandate of public policy.”193 WDVPP, therefore, represents both a remedial 
gap-filler and a judicially created method to vindicate employees’ rights 
against employers’ actions that are disruptive of public policy.194 
Although WDVPP acts as a gap-filler, some scholars nonetheless 
argue that the tort should not be so broad as to infringe on parties’ right to 
contract freely for and terminate employment.195 Even the narrowest 
public policy exception, however, allows for a wrongful discharge claim 
because the right encompassed in Parking Lot laws is well-established and 
                                                                                                             
 187. Rothstein, supra note 178, at 104 (internal quotations omitted). 
 188. Norris v. Housing Auth. of City of Galveston, 980 F. Supp. 885, 894 (S.D. 
Tex. 1997). 
 189. Good cause is generally defined as an employee’s failure to perform his 
employment duties that an ordinary employee could do. See id. 
 190. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 191. See, e.g., Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee Dept. of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d 
186, 192 (Kan. 1981) (finding that the legislature’s failure to grant a cause of 
action in the text of the statute itself does not defeat the public policy). 
 192. David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful 
Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 
645, 662 (1996). 
 193. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841−42 (Wis. 1983). 
 194. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 171 (N.C. 1992). 
 195. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 444. 
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significant.196 Given the above analysis, when a state recognizes WDVPP, 
even in the slightest form, the state also must recognize a claim of 
wrongful discharge for violation of its Parking Lot law, much like the Fifth 
Circuit and Mississippi Supreme Court held in Swindol.197 Without the tort 
of WDVPP, the employee must focus on statutory exceptions to at-will 
employment for recovery. 
B. Whistleblower Statutes’ Rationale and Rights of Action 
The goal of whistleblower statutes is to protect both the public 198 and 
whistleblowers from employers’ illegal acts and retaliation.199 Legislative 
intent in promulgating such statutes is similar to a state’s purpose in 
recognizing the WDVPP action.200 These statutes, therefore, aim to 
encourage employees to report illegal acts by granting whistleblowing 
employees a right of action against employers who retaliate or dismiss 
them.201 Although whistleblower statutes vary a great deal among the 
states as far as what an employee must do to claim whistleblower status 
and protection,202 the rationale for whistleblower statutes is similar to that 
of WDVPP. Therefore, a state’s whistleblower statute also gives employees 
terminated in violation of Parking Lot laws a cause of action. Conversely, if 
a state has neither the WDVPP tort nor a whistleblower statute, then the 
employee does not have a claim against his employer because the at-will 
employment doctrine governs. 
The rationale of WDVPP and whistleblower statutes indicates that 
state legislatures intended to enshrine public policies in Parking Lot 
laws.203 As such, Parking Lot laws must be actionable. Legislatures 
                                                                                                             
 196. It is well established in the sense that it is clearly mandated by a statutory 
provision. See Thomas P. Owens III, Employment at Will in Alaska: The Question of 
Pub. Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 269, 311 (2003). It is significant because it 
purports to promote the individual right of self-defense. See Parween S. Mascari, What 
Constitutes a “Substantial Public Policy” in West Virginia for Purposes of Retaliatory 
Discharge: Making a Mountain out of a Molehill?, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 827, 843 
(2003). Ultimately, however, “policy determinations frequently are made on an ad hoc 
basis, ultimately by the high court of the jurisdiction.” Cavico, supra note 25, at 591. 
 197. See discussion infra Part V.A. for the example of Utah. 
 198. Cluff, Jr., supra note 176, at 448−49.  
 199. See generally Nathan A. Adams IV, Distinguishing Chicken Little from 
Bona Fide Whistleblowers, 83 FLA. B.J. 100 (2009). 
 200. See generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The 
State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99 (2000).  
 201. See Faqihi, supra note 119, at 3361–63. 
 202. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 203. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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enacted these laws in light of the state’s existing WDVPP or whistleblower 
statutes, contemplating that employees terminated in violation of the 
Parking Lot provision would have some type of recourse against their 
employers. A state’s recognition of WDVPP and whistleblower status 
results in a right of action, much like the Swindol outcome. 
V. APPLYING WDVPP AND WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES TO UTAH AND 
LOUISIANA PARKING LOT LAWS 
The following subsections are case studies of the Parking Lot laws of 
Utah and Louisiana and potential actions for terminated employees. The 
Parking Lot laws of these two states are representative of the statutes of 
many other states because they contain many of the same prohibitions, 
restrictions, and limitations seen in Parking Lot laws throughout the 
country.204 Furthermore, Utah has a whistleblower statute only for public 
employees205 but recognizes WDVPP, whereas Louisiana has a general 
whistleblower provision broadly applicable to both private and public 
employees but does not recognize the tort of WDVPP.206 
A. Utah: A WDVPP State 
Utah’s Parking Lot law is similar to many other states’ but does not 
contain as many exceptions.207 Utah’s Parking Lot law provides: “[A] 
person may not establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or rule that has 
the effect of: (a) prohibiting any individual from transporting or storing a 
firearm in a motor vehicle on any property designated for motor vehicle 
parking . . . .”208 The statute requires the employee to have a legal permit 
and to store the gun out of sight in a locked vehicle.209 Yet the law gives 
the employer options to limit the storage of firearms.210 Unlike a handful 
of statutes, Utah’s statute does not impose criminal liability211 but does 
                                                                                                             
 204. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 205. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-21-3 (West 2017). 
 206. See LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (2017); see also Puig v. Greater New 
Orleans Expressway Comm’n, 772 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 2000). This statute 
also doubles as a codified version of WDVPP. See discussion Part II.B. 
 207. Compare FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(a) (2017), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 
67-21-3. 
 208. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103(1)(a). 
 209. Id. § 34-45-103(1)(a)(i)−(iii). 
 210. See id. § 34-45-103(2)(a) (stating that employers may provide an alternate 
parking lot or protected storage place before entering the normal parking area). 
 211. Id. § 34-45-105. Cf. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 790.251. 
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grant enforcement power to the state attorney general.212 The attorney 
general may file an action seeking restitution for any individual who 
suffers a loss based on a violation of the statute.213 Though an injured 
party’s claim may be brought by a state attorney general, the statute is 
unclear on whether it contemplates a private right of action for the 
terminated employee. 
Utah’s Parking Lot law purports to allow a private civil cause of action 
for any “individual who is injured, physically or otherwise, as a result of 
any policy or rule prohibited by” the Parking Lot law.214 An employee may 
argue that this provision encompasses an action for wrongful discharge by 
stating he has been “injured, physically or otherwise,” although this 
language is ambiguous. By singling out physical injury and following with 
a catchall term, the right of action may be limited to physical injuries and 
those injuries that accompany physical injuries.215 The statute does not 
explicitly mention termination or discrimination like the Parking Lot laws 
of other states,216 posing the question of whether the Utah Legislature 
actually intended to create a cause of action for termination in the 
statute.217 This ambiguity thus warrants a determination as to whether the 
statute protects a public policy made actionable by the state’s recognition 
of the WDVPP tort. 
Assuming the Parking Lot law does not grant a right of action to 
terminated employees, an employee must look to Utah’s employment law 
for recourse. In general, Utah recognizes the tort of WDVPP.218 In 
Peterson v. Browning, the Utah Supreme Court held that although every 
statute cannot be an expression of public policy, “when the statutory 
language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the affected 
interests of society are substantial,” the statute provides a basis for a 
WDVPP action.219 More recently, the court stated that it construes public 
policy narrowly to guard only “those principles which are so substantial 
                                                                                                             
 212. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-106. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. § 34-45-105 (emphasis added). 
 215. One such akin injury is mental anguish, economic damages, or those that 
might accompany physical injury. See, e.g., Susan A. Berson, The Taxation of 
Tort Damage Awards and Settlements: When Recovering More for a Client May 
Result in Less, 78 J. KAN. B. ASS’N. 21, 22 (2009). 
 216. See statutes cited supra note 114.  
 217. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 218. See, e.g., Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). 
 219. Id. at 1282. 
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and fundamental that there can be virtually no question as to [the] 
importance for promotion of the public good.”220 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes four categories of 
WDVPP: “(1) refusing to commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing 
a public obligation, (3) exercising a legal right or privilege, and (4) reporting 
to a public authority criminal activity of the employer.”221 The court is wary 
of the exception’s broad application, but the court’s clear articulation of the 
exception indicates that the Parking Lot law would encompass such a public 
policy given the legislative history of the statute.222 
Legislative drafts and comments during hearings are useful in 
determining what public policy the Utah Legislature aimed to address with 
this statute’s enactment.223 The sponsoring state senator indicated that he 
drafted the original version of the Parking Lot law in response to a Utah 
Supreme Court decision in which an employer terminated several 
employees after seeing them with guns in the company parking lot.224 In 
Hansen v. America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), the court found that the right to 
keep and bear arms in Utah was a clear and substantial policy articulated 
by the legislature in its debate over its Parking Lot law.225 The court, 
however, declined to allow public policy to trump the property interests of 
the employer.226 Because the sponsoring senator mentioned a case that 
accepted the right to keep and bear arms as an important state public 
policy, it follows that the public policy in enacting the Parking Lot law 
was to go beyond the AOL court’s holding and allow the right to keep arms 
to trump the employer’s property interest.227  
Another possible clear and substantial public policy in the Parking Lot 
law’s enactment is that of self-defense. Several times in the pre-enactment 
discussion, parties spoke about the concern that workers, if unable to store 
                                                                                                             
 220. Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 625 (Utah 2015). The court 
found that the public policy behind a “Stand Your Ground” law was self-defense 
and that the public policy of self-defense was substantial enough to warrant an 
exception to at-will employment. Id. at 625−29.  
 221. Id. at 628 (citing Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 952 (Utah 2004)). 
 222. Erin Bergeson Harris, Recent Development in Utah Law, 2005 UTAH L. 
REV. 215, 225 (2005). 
 223. Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History without Legislative Intent: The Public 
Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1999). 
 224. Utah Senate Floor, Utah State Senate-Day 35 2009 (part 2), UTAH 
LEGISLATURE (2009), http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip 
_id=8802&meta_id=425206 [https://perma.cc/8H99-EJ9N]. 
 225. Hansen, 96 P.3d at 956. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Utah State Senate-Day 35 2009, supra note 224. 
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their firearms in their vehicles, would be at a loss for self-protection in their 
daily commute to and from work.228 According to the Utah Legislature, 
these two proffered public policies are of such clarity and importance to 
warrant a recognition of the public policy exception when the Parking Lot 
law is concerned. As such, a Utah employee fired because of a violation of 
the statute was entitled to a WDVPP claim. 
B. Louisiana: A Whistleblower State 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 32:292.1, or the Parking Lot law, prohibits 
property owners and employers, among others, from stopping any person 
from storing firearms in privately owned vehicles in parking areas.229 This 
statute allows for the same alternative solutions for employers as Utah.230 Like 
Utah and 47 other states,231 Louisiana recognizes at-will employment.232 
Unlike Utah, however, Louisiana does not recognize the common-law tort of 
WDVPP.233 
Because WDVPP is unavailable, Louisiana’s whistleblower statute 
provides an employee with a right of action for his employer’s illegal acts.234 
Unlike the tort, an inquiry into legislative history is not as pertinent because 
the whistleblower statute is not contingent upon some indeterminable public 
policy.235 Instead, whether a right of action exists is purely a result of 
statutory construction and application to the facts at issue. 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 23:967, the whistleblower statute first 
enacted in 1997,236 provides for recovery in three situations. The first two 
are more traditional forms of whistleblower claims—either the employee 
discloses or threatens to disclose his employer’s violation237 or the 
                                                                                                             
 228. Id.; Senate Business and Labor Committee, UTAH LEGISLATURE, http://Utah 
legislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=13862&meta_id=507029 (last  
visited Oct. 16, 2017) (beginning at 1hour 11minutes) [https://perma.cc/SJY3-YL 7Q]. 
 229. LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1 (2017). 
 230. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 231. Swift, supra note 105, at 554. 
 232. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2024 (2017) (“A contract of unspecified duration may be 
terminated at the will of either party by giving notice, reasonable in time and form, to 
the other party.”); see also id. art. 2747 (“A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant 
attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for doing so.”). 
 233. See Guillory v. St. Landry Par. Police Jury, 802 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Gil v. Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 234. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967. 
 235. A whistleblower statute is “an embodiment of the state’s public policy 
against wrongful or retaliatory discharge.” Cavico, supra note 25, at 564. 
 236. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967 (1997). 
 237. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(1) (2017). 
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employee testifies or informs a public body of the violation.238 The last 
provision in Revised Statutes § 23:967(A)(3) goes beyond what is generally 
considered a whistleblower claim, permitting a wrongful termination action 
when the employee expresses his disapproval of the employer’s illegal act.239 
Section 23:967(A)(3) states, “An employer shall not take reprisal against an 
employee who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation 
of law . . . objects to or refuses to participate in an employment act or practice 
that is a violation of law.”240 As such, the employee must prove six elements 
to recover: 241 (1) he was in good faith;242 (2) the act or practice actually 
violated some state law;243 (3) he refused or objected to the employer’s act or 
practice;244 (4) he informed his employer of the violation;245 (5) an adverse 
employment action occurred;246 and (6) the adverse action resulted from the 
whistleblowing activity.247 
In the case of an employee like Swindol, who brought his gun to work 
in accordance with state law and subsequently was terminated, several of 
the elements of the whistleblower statute are easily met. Assuming the 
employee is in good faith, a violation of state law may be established by 
demonstrating the maintenance or enforcement of a company firearm ban, 
both of which are prohibited by the Parking Lot law.248 The next element of 
refusal or objection is satisfied by the employee’s actual gun storage on the 
company’s premises. By ignoring company policy, the employee effectively 
declines to acquiesce to the employer’s illegal practice. Turning to the last 
                                                                                                             
 238. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(2). 
 239. Several other states contain this type of refusal-to-participate provision. 
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.102(3) (2017); MINN. STAT. § 181.932(1)(3) (2017); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102, -1114 (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. § 359:B4 (2017); 
N.J. STAT. § 34:19-3 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06-20 (2017). 
 240. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(3). 
 241. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(B). The wrongfully terminated employee may recover 
back pay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and/or court costs. Id. 
 242. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A). This is a threshold question. See Accardo v. 
La. Health Servs. & Indem. Co., 943 So. 2d 381, 385 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 243. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(1). If an employee can prove only that the 
employer violated its own policy, the whistleblower claim will fail. Accardo, 943 
So. 2d at 385; Odeh v. City of Baton Rouge, 191 F. Supp. 3d 623, 628 (M.D. La. 
2017); Thomas v. La. Dep’t. of Social Servs., 406 F. App’x. 890 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 244. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(3). 
 245. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A). See Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. 
State Univ., 72 F. Supp. 3d 627, 647 (M.D. La. 2014). 
 246. See Tatum v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 79 So. 3d 1094, 1104 (La. Ct. App. 
2011), writ denied, 82 So.3d 290 (La. 2012). 
 247. See Herster, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 647. 
 248. See LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1. 
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two elements of adverse employment action and causation, termination 
explicitly falls within the statute’s definition of “reprisal,”249 and the close 
temporal proximity of the refusal to participate to the reprisal is indicative 
of a causal link.250 
Thus far, five of the six identified elements will be met in a case with 
facts similar to Swindol. The only element of the § 23:967(A)(3) action 
posing an issue for employees terminated in violation of the Parking Lot 
law is that which requires the employee to inform his employer of the 
violation.251 This provision demands that if the employee believes an 
actual violation has occurred, he first must inform his employer of the 
possible violation before objecting or refusing to participate.252 In many 
cases, an employee will not know to notify the employer first that its ban 
is unlawful before bringing his gun to work to defy the company policy. 
The case law signals, however, that this element is unavoidable—the 
employee first must notify his supervisor before refusing to participate to 
be protected under the whistleblower statute.253 
The Parking Lot law clearly makes it illegal for companies to enforce 
bans on firearms.254 As such, if an employer’s policy conflicted with that 
law and the employer fired an employee for the gun, then the employee is 
covered under Louisiana’s whistleblower statute, provided the employee 
is in good faith and first notifies the employer of the ban’s illegality.255 
The employee would have a right of action provided that reprisal was 
made against him for “refus[ing] to participate in an employment act or 
practice that is in violation of law.”256 
                                                                                                             
 249. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(C)(1). 
 250. See Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
temporal proximity will support a finding of causation “when the protected act and 
the adverse employment action are ‘very close’ in time”). 
 251. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A). 
 252. See Gerald J. “Jerry” Huffman, Jr., The New Louisiana Employment 
Statutes: What Hath the Legislature Wrought, 58 LA. L. REV. 1033, 1061 (1998). 
 253. Mabry v. Andrus, 34 So. 3d 1075, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 254. See LA. REV. STAT. § 32:292.1(C) , which states, 
No property owner, tenant, public or private employer, or business entity 
shall prohibit any person from transporting or storing a firearm pursuant 
to Subsection A of this Section. However, nothing in this Section shall 
prohibit an employer or business entity from adopting policies specifying 
that firearms stored in locked, privately-owned motor vehicles on 
property controlled by an employer or business entity be hidden from 
plain view or within a locked case or container within the vehicle. 
Id. 
 255. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967(A)(3). 
 256. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Parking Lot laws, which are presumably constitutional, encompass the 
rights to keep and bear arms and to self-defense. In their promulgation of such 
statutes, legislatures elevated employees’ rights above their employers, 
infringing upon companies’ private property rights. As such, companies can 
no longer impose an outright ban on having firearms on company premises, 
thus expanding the potential for workplace violence like that at Black & 
Decker. Regardless of possible workplace violence, however, employers must 
abide by the provisions of Parking Lot laws. When an employer neglects to 
do so, an employee may recover for the violation of Parking Lot laws, 
depending on the employment law of the state. Some generalizations are to 
be made in determining whether a state’s law grants a remedy; for instance, 
when a Parking Lot law neglects to grant an explicit remedy, employees can 
recover under the tort of WDVPP or alternatively under a whistleblower 
statute because Parking Lot laws encompass important public policies. 
Recognition of either WDVPP or whistleblower status allows for public 
enforcement of the laws: when an employee is terminated for storing his gun 
in accordance with a Parking Lot law, the law grants him with the ability to 
enforce the law by bringing a WDVPP or whistleblower action. In the event 
that a state does not acknowledge WDVPP or a whistleblower exception, the 
doctrine of employment-at-will prevails, and the violation is not actionable. 
This Comment supposes that future courts should find merit in all future 
actions brought by gun-storing terminated employees, meaning the Fifth 
Circuit rightly decided Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corp. both as a 
matter of law and of policy. 
Malerie Leigh Bulot* 
                                                                                                             
  J.D./D.C.L., 2018. Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
This Comment is dedicated to my late grandparents, Rachel and Joseph Bulot, and 
father, Michael Bulot, who encouraged and enabled me to be the best student 
possible and to achieve my ultimate goal of becoming a lawyer. Special thanks is 
due to my fiancé, Brad Morrison, and immediate and extended family. Many thanks 
to Professor Bill Corbett for introducing me to this topic and advising me as it 
developed. Lastly, thank you to Louisiana Law Review Vol. 78 Editorial Board, 
which spent countless hours perfecting this Comment and chatting with me in the 
Law Review suite.  
 
